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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S9 
'DOCKET NO:-
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JUAN DIOS CANTU, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880155 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction imposed for 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah code 
Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended); Aggravated Burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as 
amended); and Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended), in the 
Third judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v, 
JUAN DIOS CANTU, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880155 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set 
forth in Appellant's opening brief at 1-5. Mr. Cantu takes this 
opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief. Mr. Cantu's 
argument in regard to the arguments set forth in Points II and III 
of Respondent's Brief is adequately set forth in Appellant's opening 
brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
supplementing the jury panel. Furthermore, the State did not follow 
the required statutory procedure for challenging the procedure by 
which a jury is empanelled and did not challenge the procedure on 
direct appeal. By failing to so challenge the procedure, the State 
waived any argument it might have had that the jury was improperly 
empanelled. In addition, regardless of whether the trial court 
erred in supplementing the jury panel, once the jury panel had been 
supplemented, the prosecutor could not exercise his peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
(Reply to Rspondent's Point I) 
MR, CANTU'S RIGHTS WERE PREJUDICED BY THE 
PROSECUTOR'S EXERCISE OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE, 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN SUPPLEMENTING THE JURY PANEL. 
In its brieff the State relies on State v, Tillmany 750 
P.2d 546/ 573-77 (Utah 1987) in support of its argument that "the 
trial court's supplementation of the jury and the procedures used 
were improper." Respondent's Brief at 10. Respondent argues that 
since this Court found Defendant's fair cross-section claim to be 
meritless in Tillman/ the trial court in the present case erred in 
finding that the fair cross-section guarantee was violated and in 
supplementing the jury panel in order to overcome that violation. 
Respondent's Brief at 11. R. 323-31. Contrary to the assertions of 
the State, the trial court in the instant case did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the fair cross-section guarantee was 
violated or in supplementing the jury panel. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13 (1953 as amended) outlines the 
procedure for drawing jury panels and the procedure to be followed 
when a shortage of jurors occurs. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-3(4) 
provides: 
If there is an unanticipated shortage of available 
trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel/ 
the court may require the clerk of the court to 
summon a sufficient number of trial jurors 
selected at random by the court from the qualified 
jury wheel. 
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In the instant case, the trial judge determined that 
there were no members of a minority race on the jury panel, T. 63. 
The Court also determined that the population of minority persons in 
Salt Lake County was large enough to require two minority race 
persons be on a jury panel. T. 161. Although the record is 
somewhat unclear, it appears that the trial court did not limit its 
finding to Hispanics and suggested that the panel be supplemented by 
one Hispanic and one person of another minority race. T. 162. 
Hence, the finding of the trial court was not limited to Hispanics, 
but to minority persons in general. 
The finding of the trial judge was reasonable in light of 
the evidence presented to him at the hearing as well as his own 
awareness as a result of being a member of a minority group. After 
the judge determined that the fair cross-section guarantee was 
violated, he supplemented the panel pursuant to the provisions set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13(4) (1953 as amended). He directed 
the clerk of the court to select from the qualified jury wheel the 
next two persons with minority surnames. T. 162-3. Hence, the 
provisions of the statute were followed and the minority jurors were 
randomly selected based upon where their names appeared on the jury 
wheel. 
Furthermore, the statute specifically limits the time in 
which a party may move to stay proceedings or for other appropriate 
relief on the ground of a substantial failure to comply with the 
act. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-16 (1953 as amended) states: 
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(1) Within seven days after the moving party 
discovered, or by the exercise of diligence 
could have discovered, the grounds 
therefore, and in any event before the trial 
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may 
move to stay the proceedings or to quash an 
indictment, or for other appropriate relief, 
on the ground of substantial failure to 
comply with this act in selecting a grand or 
trial jury. 
(2) Upon motion filed under this section 
containing a sworn statement of acts which, 
if true, would constitute a substantial 
failure to comply with this act, the moving 
party is entitled to present testimony of a 
jury commissioner, the clerk of the court, 
any relevant records and papers not public 
or otherwise available used by the jury 
commission or the clerk, and any other 
relevant evidence. If the court determines 
that in selecting either a grand or a trial 
jury there has been a substantial failure to 
comply with this act, and it appears that 
actual and substantial injustice and 
prejudice has resulted or will result to a 
paty in consequence of the failure, the 
court shall stay the proceedings pending the 
selection of the jury in conformity with 
this act, quash an indictment, or grant 
other appropriate relief. 
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section 
are the exclusive means by which a person 
accused of a crime, the State, or a party in 
a civil case may challenge a jury on the 
grounds that the jury was not selected in 
conformity with this act. 
The State failed to file a motion to stay proceedings or 
for other appropriate relief or a sworn statement, both of which are 
required in order to challenge a jury under the act. On direct 
appeal, the State also failed to challenge the selection procedure. 
By failing to follow the provisions of the act, and by failing to 
raise the issue on direct appeal, the State has waived any argument 
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that may have existed regarding erroneous supplementation of the 
jury panel. 
B. ONCE THE JURY PANEL WAS SUPPLEMENTED, 
THE PROSECUTOR COULD NOT USE HIS PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES IN A DISCRIMINATORY MANNER. 
Regardless of whether the trial court erred in 
supplementing the jury panel, once that supplementation occurred, 
the prosecutor could not exercise his peremptory challenges in a 
discriminatory manner. The discriminatory use of the challenges 
caused an equal protection violation regardless of whether the trial 
court violated the statute in supplementing the jury. A prosecutor 
who violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 
to the federal constitution cannot hide behind that violation by 
arguing that a statutory error occurred. In this case, where the 
prosecutor did not formally challenge the supplementation procedure 
as required by the statute, his subsequent violation of the equal 
protection clause violated Mr. Cantu's rights, requiring reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, JUAN 
DIOS CANTU, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
convictions and the matter remanded to the District Court for a new 
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trial. 
Respectfully submitted this j~> day of January, 1989. 
MSfXL rl.^w\^ 
LISA J.^REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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